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## Further Remarks on the Congo

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. THOMAS J. DODD**

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, September 27, 1961

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, during the month of September I spoke repeatedly in the Senate, criticizing U.N. intervention in Katanga and the composition of the Adoula-Gizenga coalition government in Leopoldville, which has been fostered by the U.N.

At that time, I had the feeling of belonging to an ineffective minority. The general trend of editorial policy seemed to support the U.N., although with some misgivings.

Within the past 2 weeks that has been a significant shift in editorial opinion. And the last few days have brought highly encouraging news concerning the conclusion of a formal cease-fire agreement between the United Nations forces and the Government of Katanga.

Over a 2-week period, the following articles and editorials appeared in national newspapers and periodicals, and I ask unanimous consent that they be inserted in the Appendix of the Record.

First. Article in the Wall Street Journal describing how U.N. was forced to intervene to prevent the Leopoldville Government from using U.S. aid dollars to purchase Communist arms in guise of "machinery."

Second. Editorial in the New York Times stating that the U.N.'s attempt to end the Katanga secession by force has failed, and that a solution must be found by conciliation within a federated state structure. It warned that the U.N. troops must not be tricked into aiding Gizenga and his Communist-oriented army take over the Adoula government from the inside.

Third. A feature article by Mr. S. L. A. Marshall which appeared in the editorial page of the New York Herald Tribune, presents the case for Katanga and President Tshombe.

Fourth. A lengthy letter to the editor of the New York Times written by Mr. George H. T. Kimble, former director of the American Geographical Society and

head of the Geographic Department at Indiana University.

Fifth. An editorial in the New York Herald Tribune entitled "Let's Keep an Eye on the Congo," which takes the stand that the real threat to Congolese independence comes not from the Belgians whom President Tshombe has used to help maintain order, public services and economic vitality; "it comes from the Soviets and their allies who have been sheltered and encouraged in their intrigues by Antoine Gizenga and his demagogic predecessor, Patrice Lumumba."

Sixth. Editorial entitled "Are We Helping Deliver the Congo to the Communists?" from the Saturday Evening Post.

Seventh. New York Times article dealing with cease-fire agreement in Katanga.

There being no objection, the articles and editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal]

**REDS IN THE CONGO: THEY INTENSIFY POWER BID, HOLD KEY POSTS IN LEOPOLDVILLE REGIME—U.S. AID DOLLARS ALMOST BUY ARMS FOR PRO-COMMUNISTS IN GUISE OF "MACHINERY"—THE VOICE OF RADIO MOSCOW**

(By John R. Gibson)

**LEOPOLDVILLE.**—Could the United States unwittingly help finance wily Communists attempting to take over the Congo?

As unbelievable as it seems, this is exactly what might have happened here except for last minute intervention the other day by United Nations representatives who suddenly spotted and became suspicious of a proposed Congolese trade agreement with East Germany.

Here is what happened, according to U.N. officials:

A high-ranking minister in the Congo's coalition central government, aided by a leftist Belgian adviser, secretly formulated an agreement to exchange 40 million francs (\$800,000 at the official exchange rate), palm oil, and other products for East German "machinery." The only immediate outlay from the Congo's scanty foreign exchange would have been a 5-percent payment into a Swiss bank account. This 5 percent would have come out of \$10 million in economic aid funneled into the Congo by Uncle Sam through the U.N. earlier this year.

"MACHINES" WERE ARMS

The proposed deal got almost completely through channels before it was discovered and blocked by the U.N. It took little investigation, U.N. sleuths report, to establish that the "machinery" actually was to consist of armaments, probably destined for

Communist-sympathizing Congolese army troops based at Stanleyville.

As if this were not disturbing enough, it is believed the 5-percent payment eventually would have found its way back to the Congo, partly as a payoff to the minister and his Belgian adviser, and partly to finance propaganda activities against the present central government headed by Cyrille Adoula. Although this government, being a coalition, contains some pro-Communists, it is supported by the United States and generally is regarded as pro-Western.

The proposed deal with East Germany was just one of the many angles being tried here by the Communists and their allies, followers of the slain Patrice Lumumba. Their aim is simple: To take over the Congo. Their strategy, as deduced by westerners aware of what's going on: To twist the Adoula government to their purposes or, if that doesn't work, to turn the Congo once again into a brawling basin of tribal warfare—probably a fatal blow to U.N. prestige here.

### REDS STAGE COMEBACK

Although the Communists and their sympathizers haven't had too much influence in Leopoldville since they were driven out by Congolese Gen. Joseph Mobutu a year ago, the near-success of the trade deal with East Germany points up their rapid comeback here.

As often is the case in new countries where everyone is bidding for personal power, it's difficult to tell which politician is a Communist, which a power seeker with no sincere political philosophy, and which is merely for sale to the highest bidder. In some ways, however, it makes little difference here in the Congo which of the three types a politician may be; if any of the three, he is probably getting his support from the Communists and would follow Moscow's direction.

Leading the list of pro-Communists here is Antoine Gizenga, a vice premier in the central government. Mr. Gizenga, a Lumumba follower, set up a rump government in Stanleyville last year after Lumumba's death and received counsel from known Communists. But many insiders believe Mr. Gizenga lost political power by hesitating for several weeks before deciding to enter the present Leopoldville government.

These authorities consider Chrystophe Gbenye, who was Mr. Gizenga's right-hand man at Stanleyville, as the most dangerous leftist leader in Leopoldville. As interior minister, he controls the police. He and his aides have been suggesting to some newspapers supporting the Adoula government that they may face censorship if they don't advocate tougher action against secessionist Katanga Province. Mineral-rich Katanga, headed by Moïse Tshombe, so far has vigorously resisted Communist influence and reunion with the rest of the Congo.

OTHER LEFTISTS HOLD HIGH POSTS

Jason Sendwe, the other vice premier of the Leopoldville regime, also rates as a dangerous leftist, Westerners say. Mr. Sendwe lost out to Mr. Tshombe as Katanga's president. Other pro-Communists in the Adoula government: Remy Mwamba, minister of justice; Marel Bisukiro, foreign commerce minister; Joseph Lutula, who has the curious title of minister of the middle classes; and Egide Bochely-Davidson, whom pro-Reds pressured Mr. Adoula into naming chief administrator in Katanga, a job he still hasn't taken over.

With such men in powerful positions, it stands to reason that there will be a sharp increase in leftist activities, Westerners say.

Already, such a trend is noticeable. Although the old Lumumbist newspapers died out during the past year, a new one, *Le Matin*, has just made its bow. It shouts the leftist line that the Adoula government should squash Katanga fast with arms and without consulting the United Nations. Notices announce meetings of "young Lumumbist" groups.

These organizations have been hampered by a lack of leaders. After General Mobutu forced Russian and other Communist diplomats to flee Leopoldville, paid Red agents simply went underground or to Stanleyville. Now every plane from Stanleyville brings more of these leaders back.

From outside the Congo, Russia's Radio Moscow booms in over the short wave radios most Africans have access to. East Germans circulate a brochure declaring their policy to be "Africa for Africans."

Westerners expect Communist agitation here will increase after resumption of formal diplomatic relations between the Congo and Red lands. "The Communists are keeping quiet until they win recognition," asserts one Western envoy. "When they get that they'll open up. We're dealing with experts."

Moderate government leaders, notably Justin Bomboko, foreign minister, and Joseph Ileo, information minister, are trying to stave off the Red advance. But the job isn't easy.

Leftist Gbenye's authority over the police means the government must find other means of enforcing a clampdown on Red propaganda. Some moderates favor turning the job over to General Mobutu's army but that would raise the danger of losing control over the trigger-happy soldiers. The U.N. has helped some by deporting during the past 2 weeks 30 local Belgians known to be Communists or some other breed of agitator.

If the present government here fails to control the left, as many pessimists believe will be the case, there is the possibility General Mobutu will return to action. He is rated strongly anti-Communist and hasn't said much during recent months. Observers question how much of the Congolese national army he controls but they concede it is enough to cause a new crisis. Another point: If General Mobutu should go into action, the U.N. might feel obliged to oppose him.

General Mobutu's lack of control over the important Stanleyville arm of the national army adds another advantage for the Reds. The Stanleyville force is controlled by Gen. Victor Lundula, Mr. Gizenga's chief of staff during the Stanleyville separatist regime. General Lundula has volunteered to march his army on Katanga, and Mr. Tshombe's government radio station periodically announces the Lundula army is on the move. U.N. representatives scoff at these charges but privately they fret that just this may happen.

What all this adds up to is a possible collapse of the central government here and an abrupt end to the United Nations and American influence. At worst, Westerners figure, this would lead to a Communist takeover; at best, it might result in a long period of unrest and neutralism.

[From the New York Times]

#### THE SMOLDERING CONGO

Among the many problems facing the now leaderless United Nations is one that is

surpassed in importance only by the Berlin crisis and the crisis over the Secretary Generalship. This problem is the Congo, where an uneasy truce threatens to explode into new violence that could again rock Africa, the United Nations, and the world.

The Congo presents three problems in one. The first is how to reunite the Congo, in particular how to reintegrate secession-minded Katanga, whose riches and revenues are essential to make the Congo a viable state. The United Nations' attempt to end Katanga's secession by force has failed. A solution must be found by conciliation, not new U.N. ultimatums, and within the long-projected federal structure that provides for substantial self-government for the federated states. This seems to be what President Tshombe really seeks. He is now half in, half out, of the Congo, but he has appealed to Premier Adoula for a "palaver," which is the African way of settling things. The Premier should not refuse.

The second problem is how to prevent Communist-oriented Deputy Premier Gizenga and his still independent army under General Lundula from taking over the Adoula government from the inside. Soviet agents, now returned to Leopoldville, are working toward that end. The U.N. troops, financed mainly by the United States, must not be tricked into aiding such a plot.

The third problem is how to maintain the United Nations troops in the Congo as a stabilizing force in the face of mounting deficits that threaten the United Nations with bankruptcy. Far too many states are following the Russian example in refusing to pay their assessments. It is up to the Assembly to take action against them. They are violating their charter obligation, the prescribed penalty for which is suspension of membership or expulsion.

[From the New York Herald Tribune]

#### THE STRANGE CASE OF KATANGA

(By S. L. A. Marshall)

In the Congo story there is nothing more ironic than the course of events which makes Moise Tshombe of Katanga the villain, the main antagonist of the United Nations, while Antoine Gizenga, the skulker from Orientale province, emerges as cooperator of sorts and almost a hero.

That happens only because the U.N. has its own design for the Congo, however much that plan may be against nature, and irrespective of the sufficient proof over the past 15 months that it is an excessive expectation.

It happens also because Gizenga sees what he thinks is a first-class opening by which ultimately to subvert the U.N.'s undertakings by grabbing power himself, which would mean riddance to the U.N. and all its works in darkest Africa.

Also, it happens because Tshombe still holds out, preferring that the little something solid (meaning Katanga) in the Congo quicksand to union with a central government which merely drifts along without either gaining political control of the country or demonstrating a capacity to administer it if it did.

The U.N. had great dreams. All of the Congolese chieftains were to get together in one big happy political family and henceforth speak the language of brotherly love. Thereafter, with the U.N. leading them by the hand they would be tutored into that degree of wisdom requisite to reestablishing the Congo as a thriving and productive union of provinces populated mainly by savages. It was foolish from the start. The leading Congolese had no such potential.

But what was the fundamental job, really? Simply this, the return of law and order, so that men and women would return to work, trade and industry would resume, food would move where it was required and creature satisfactions would return to normal. There would then be something for government to govern. That possibility could not be furthered by returning to a government in the Congo that was still operative.

Katanga did not share in the general col-

lapse. Villain or no, Tshombe kept his province solid, productive and reasonably tranquil, considering the obstacles strewn in his path. The mines continued their output. The people were fed. And though Katanga cargo took a different route to the sea, its communications for the most part remained in repair, in contrast to other provinces. To Tshombe's credit, he at least did a more effective job of administering a large area, and avoiding chaos, than any other single Congolese. Further, he did not initiate separatism in Katanga. It has always had semi-autonomous control of its own affairs because the Belgian mining companies were powerful enough politically to keep it that way.

Tshombe sinned in two ways. The first was his bid for independence which was offensive to U.N.'s controlling idea toward the Congo, though it has recklessly supported the principle of self-determination practically everywhere else on the globe. His collateral transgression was the withholding of revenues by the Congo's one prospering province. The central government is many millions worse than bankrupt and hurting worse every day in its pocketbook. So blame Tshombe.

But listen also to this comment on the Leopoldville government by the U.N.'s Dr. Carl Sture Linner: "Its lack of money is not as dire as its lack of knowledge about how to spend it." If that be true, Tshombe's crime was that he would not help finance profligacy and ineptitude in a ministry whose control over the Congo extends hardly beyond the near horizon.

Furthermore, it was not Tshombe through his separatism and withholding of taxes, who prostrated the Congo. His withdrawal was an exacerbating factor but not the main squeeze. The damage done by it could be remedied soon enough, unless the U.N. embroils the whole community in trying to discipline one man, since Tshombe at least kept Katanga reasonably whole.

When Gizenga, the heir of the late Patrice Lumumba, withdrew to Stanleyville with his military cohorts, making by his presence a fief-holding of Oriental province, that was what scuttled the Congo's main chance for a gradual recovery. It also settled famine and worklessness on millions of Congolese.

There ensued a political blockading of the Congo River over the 1,100-mile stretch of its navigable waters between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. It was pressed from both directions as the politicians at both ends each sought to starve the other out, irrespective of the costs to the multitude.

When nothing moves on that great waterway, the Congo is in fully desperate straits. The stream is the life artery of the whole central basin of Africa and the immediate surrounding highlands. Roads and rails tie into it to make a communications network possible. Except that the jungle is more fruitful, depriving the region of this waterway is like keeping the Nile from Egypt.

That was Gizenga's contribution. The U.N. and the Congo moderates have temporarily made peace with him because it seems politically expedient. They should know better. The whole territory abounds with other alligators.

[From the New York Times]

#### U.N. IN KATANGA—ACTION HELD CONTRARY TO AGENCY'S ROLE, FLEBISCITE ADVOCATED

(The writer of the following letter, former director of the American Geographical Society and head of the Geography Department at Indiana University, is the author of "Tropical Africa.")

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

There is something deeply disturbing about the recent activities of the U.N. in Katanga. For here is an agency dedicated to the finding of peaceful solutions to world problems, engaged in a war against people whose chief offense is that they happen to be richer than their provincial neighbors and object to the prospect of being either run or killed by them.

No matter how well meant this interven-

tion may be, it can scarcely fail to disillusion those who hitherto have thought of the U.N. forces in the Congo as a kind of peace corps. This intervention is also calculated to confirm the suspicion of those who are beginning to wonder if the U.N. is not resorting to the very kind of coercion it has long condemned in the colonial powers.

Then, again, it is bound to produce anxiety in the minds of many yet-to-be-liberated peoples, for if the U.N. imposes its will on the inhabitants of Katanga, will it not later try to do the same on the Baganda, the Barotse, the Masai, and all the other African groups who equally have no taste for subjection to their stronger neighbors.

#### DETERMINING STATUS

Be this as it may, I take leave to wonder if the action of the U.N. is really in harmony with the spirit of its deliverances on the subject of self-determination. One of these, made in 1955 at a meeting of the Social Commission of the Economic and Social Council, stated that "all peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination—namely, the right freely to determine their political, economic, social, and cultural status."

If this statement means anything, it means freedom for the inhabitants of Katanga to decide, without internal compulsion or external fixing, what kind of government they want and who shall govern them. True, they may not qualify as a nation in the Western sense of the word, but most of them have as much identity as the 18th century Americans and the 20th century Jews, and as much right to the appellation of peoples.

The fact that they find themselves living inside the same political boundaries as several dozen other peoples is, I submit, no reason for the United Nations insistence that they should go on doing so, for the boundaries were artificial (being unethnic) in the first place, and in the second place, the peoples have few, if any, common bonds, other than their former subjection to Belgian rule and opposition to it. Many of them, in fact, differ at least as much as the Swedes do from the Spaniards.

#### EQUATORIAL TERRITORIES

The United Nations did not insist that the peoples of the heavily mineralized Gabon should continue to live in political association with those of the other three territories of French Equatorial Africa when they received their independence in 1960. On the contrary, it welcomed all four of them immediately and unanimously into its growing membership.

If, as is commonly affirmed, the main reason for the United Nations insistence on the continued political adherence of Katanga to the rest of the former Belgian Congo is because this province is heavily mineralized, it is surely surprising that the U.N. did not likewise insist on the continued political association of Gabon with its erstwhile French neighbors for, insofar as they are known, the geographical endowments of the Central African Republic and the Republics of Chad and Congo (Brazzaville) are individually smaller than those of the six provinces of the former Belgian Congo.

Not, of course, that the Central African Republic and the Republics of Chad and Congo (Brazzaville) are alone in their slender means. At least 10 of the African countries welcomed into the membership of the United Nations during the past 6 years have smaller revenues than any of the 6 Belgian Congo provinces had on the eve of the country's independence in 1960. At least five have, it could be argued, a lower "viability rating" than any Congolese province.

Would it not be better perhaps for the United Nations to use its meager financial resources for supervising a plebiscite to decide what kind of political allegiances the peoples of the Congo desire to form, rather than enforce an alien, and palpably unwelcome, will on one of them? There is a precedent for this. In 1960, the United Nations recently taken in British Cameroons with quite satisfactory results. There is also a

compelling reason for it, namely, the maintenance of world peace—and the United Nations own high standing as the chief instrument of such peace.

GEORGE H. T. KIMBLE.  
SOLSBERY, IND., September 26, 1961.

[From the New York Herald Tribune]

#### LET'S KEEP AN EYE ON THE CONGO

For years it was possible to say, "Let Dag do it," with the knowledge that a difficult situation would at least be in the hands of an immensely capable and incorruptible public servant. But now there is no Dag, and this makes a world of difference—quite notably in the Congo, where he so tragically and abruptly lost his life.

Though an uneasy truce still prevails in Katanga, the Congo is by no means out of danger.

As it always has, the real threat to Congolese independence comes not from the Belgians whom Moïse Tshombe has used to help maintain order, economic vitality, and essential services in Katanga; it comes from the Soviets and their allies, who have been sheltered and encouraged in their intrigues by Antoine Gizenga and his demagogic predecessor, Patrice Lumumba.

With the world's attention diverted, Iron Curtain agents have been pouring into Leopoldville to work their mischief, or at least to try to the best of their considerable ability. Premier Adoula has apparently been trying to steer an independent middle course, but whether he can succeed is still an open question. Vice Premier Gizenga and his lieutenant, Christophe Gbenye, in the vital post of Interior Minister, are at least Communist sympathizers, and there has been little evidence that Gizenga has abandoned his ambition to rule the Congo.

The U.N. army was turned against the only consistently stable, Western-oriented regime the Congo has known, which threatened no one. And the central government's plan to make a Red-leaning Gizenga deputy boss of Katanga if the U.N. operation had succeeded should be ample indication that all is not yet well in Adoula land.

It should be a warning to the West that any further efforts to force unification had better be scrutinized with care before they are allowed to proceed.

Congolese unity is still a goal to be pursued—but not unity at any price. Not at the price of freedom; not at the price of forced submission to a regime in which Communist agents and/or sympathizers have been allowed to gain control.

They have not yet gained control of the Leopoldville government. But there is a real danger that they may, unless the West plays its cards with care and determination.

Premier Adoula still has to prove himself. The U.N., after its spectacular blunder in Katanga, has to reestablish its claim to confidence. This will be harder without Mr. Hammarskjöld.

Meanwhile, the U.N.—which has been assembling an air force in the Congo—ought to be put on clear notice that any renewal of its military offensive would be intolerable. And the United States—which as chief support of the U.N. operation has a moral as well as practical stake—had best keep a close watch.

Right doesn't alone make might in this imperfect world. It has to be made to prevail.

[From the Saturday Evening Post]

#### ARE WE HELPING DELIVER THE CONGO TO THE COMMUNISTS?

The New York Times put it conservatively when it stated recently that the United Nations, in invading the Katanga Province of the Congo, had set a precedent "at considerable risk to itself." Surely if the United Nations can invade the Congo to enforce its own theory of what this country's Government should be like—an action not hinted at by the United Nations, and which other nations will want to know what goes on. Leaving aside the pompous nonsense re-

garding the need to "bring peace to the Congo," the fact is that United Nations troops (financed for more than \$40 million by the United States) brought war to the one part of the Congo where there was peace, prosperity, cooperation among the various races and an imposing "infrastructure" (to borrow a word from U.N. gobbledygook) of modern civilized living. President Tshombe of Katanga had agreed to go along with a federation of Congolese States, but the United Nations insisted that Katanga must submit to the total authority of a Communist-dominated central government.

Why representatives of the United States, which is a federal system, should crack down on the federal form of government for the Congo is beyond us. Even more mysterious is our support of the United Nations effort to force Katanga to weaken its economic and military posture by deporting white officers and officials. Mercenaries these are called, except when they are Communist Czechs, Poles, or Soviet citizens; then they become technicians. Following this imposition of racism, unwanted by the Katangans, came the demand, also backed by the United States, that Katanga knuckle under to the Communist-dominated central authorities.

As to the central authorities, Senator THOMAS J. DONN, of Connecticut, produced a translation of an article in the Soviet publication New Times which stated that the followers of Lumumba had a clear majority in the Congolese parliament and that Premier Cyrille Adoula was committed to carry out all decisions made earlier by the Lumumba government. It was already known that Adoula had agreed to make one of the Red-trained Gizenga's men minister of the interior (in charge of the police), and that one Egide Bochely-Davidson, another Lumumba protégé, was to be chief administrator of Katanga.

Had it not been for the tragic accident which ended his life, Secretary General Hammarskjöld might have rescued the United Nations from the consequences of its blunders. That the mess may have been created by U.N. representatives on the spot, without sanction by the home office, is suggested by the willingness of President Tshombe of Katanga to deal with Hammarskjöld despite his previous refusal to talk with Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, the local U.N. "enforcer." The invasion of Katanga was obviously ordered without approval by the Security Council, as is made plain by the protests of the foreign offices of Great Britain and France. Lord Lansdowne, Britain's parliamentary undersecretary for foreign affairs, who talked with the late Secretary General before his death, is convinced that the U.N. forces had exceeded their instructions. We may be sure, in spite of the uneasy truce, that the Communists have not given up in the Congo.

Why do we go along with a course so freighted with disaster to the Congo and our commercial and strategic interests? For one thing, there is in the United States a heavily brainwashed but socially and financially prominent minority which has what the kids call a "thing" about the United Nations. These people pay little attention to what the United Nations actually does. All criticism is met by cries that "the United Nations is the hope of the world," or that it "stands between us and the horror of nuclear war." This sort of thing may represent the triumph of hope over experience, but it does constitute a considerable part of American public opinion to which any administration feels obliged to pay some heed. So the Communists get the strategic key to Africa—and the cobalt—and we get the consciousness of having acted nobly and disinterestedly.

We can hardly be expected to stand by the U.N., when the U.N. too often seems concerned with prompting Soviet objectives, especially in the Congo, whose people, insofar as they are articulate, want continued cooperation with the West.

[From the New York Times]

**U.N. AND KATANGA AGREE ON TRADING CONGO PRISONERS—PROVISIONAL PACT ALSO CALLS FOR WORLD BODY'S TROOPS TO YIELD SOME POSTS**

(By David Halberstam)

LEOPOLDVILLE, THE CONGO.—A prisoner exchange agreement between United Nations and Katangan officials was announced here today by the United Nations command in the Congo.

The agreement is not final. It still requires approval by United Nations headquarters in New York.

The accord, which the United Nations describes as a protocol implementation of the cease fire that was agreed on last month, also calls for the withdrawal of United Nations troops from several positions they took during 8 days of fighting in Katanga.

The cease-fire went into effect September 21. It was agreed on in Ndola, northern Rhodesia, between United Nations officials and Moïse Tshombe, President of secessionist Katanga Province.

The truce followed fighting that began September 13 when United Nations troops took over in Elizabethville, the provincial capital, in an attempt to restore the province to the control of the central Government in Leopoldville.

**TSHOMBE AGREES TO TRADE**

President Tshombe and Mahmoud Khiari of Tunisia, a United Nations official, reached the prisoner-exchange agreement in Elizabethville last night.

It calls for an exchange of prisoners without further delay. This is scheduled to take place Monday afternoon.

The Katangans have 191 United Nations prisoners—184 Irish, 5 Italians, 1 Swede, and 1 Norwegian. The United Nations has an estimated total of 220 Katangan prisoners.

The agreement also calls for the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Elizabethville's post office, radio station, the Lido Hotel, and an underpass on the fringe of town that had been a key point during the fighting.

The agreement creates three subcommissions, each composed of two Katangan officers and two United Nations officers, to carry out inspection at any time and at any place at the request of either party. A complaint by either side on a possible violation of the cease fire would be handled by the subcommissions.

**CIVILIANS DISARMED**

The Katangans, according to the agreement, would assure that no civilians carried weapons. Both sides would work to stop hostile propaganda. This has been a key point. The United Nations has charged that the radio station in Elizabethville had been used primarily to stir up anti-United Nations feeling.

The United Nations had expected to give up the post office as part of the agreement. But some of the other points of the agreement, such as the withdrawal from the tunnel, were last-minute concessions to the Katangese.

The agreement also will permit the Katangese to operate again at the airport, which has been a United Nations stronghold. Katangan troops will be allowed to return to the airport and the Katangans will be able to fly provisions out of the airport to their troops in the back country. Civilian air flights will be resumed.

In effect, the agreement puts the airport under joint control.

Katangan forces and United Nations forces will remain in the positions they occupied on September 12 at Albertville, Niemba, Nyunzu, and Jadotville.

The agreement also provides that the United Nations will not consider the cease fire to be violated if Katangan troops reply to fire from some external attack.

Nothing more is given on this point. But the central Congo Government has made it clear that this agreement does not apply to it.



The point is that some of the officials, since the United Nations mandate here calls for it to take any action necessary to prevent

civil war.

United Nations officials here declined to comment on the agreement. There was no doubt that the concessions to Mr. Tshombe caught some officials here by surprise. Mr. Khiari is withholding comment until he returns here and Dr. Sture C. Linner, head of the United Nations mission in the Congo, is also withholding comment.

Mr. Khiari told officials here that the afternoon session with Mr. Tshombe had been marked by several eruptions and then returns. Mr. Tshombe called the new agreement a victory for Katanga.

It was noted here that the document made no reference to the February 21 resolution expelling mercenaries from Katanga. News-men had been told there would be a reference to this in the agreement.

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Remarks:					
<p>As I indicated on the telephone, two of the attached items were remarks made by Senator Dodd prior to his recent African trip and two are statements made following his trip.</p> <p>25X1A </p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
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